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effort required to access it, thereby affecting the relevance of that
context. So an explanation of why a particular context was chosen
must ultimately refer to a particular organizational structure of
EM. In short, to explain context selection, S&W must have a
theory about the organization of EM. They do not, however, have
such a theory.
S&W suggest that EM is organized into "chunks," which consist
of a set of assumptions that enable us to formulate expectations in
stereotypical situations. However, they fail to specify the nature of
these chunks. This omission enables them to account for the
selection of a context through the ad hoc postulation of a particular
chunk. Since there are no prior constraints on the individuation
of chunks, any two pieces of information can belong to the same
chunk at their discretion. Thus, through the vacuousness of their
claims about EM organization, they can postulate any accessibility
relation between contexts, accessibility being a central component
in the search for relevance.
S&Ws inability to explain context selection is evidenced by their
discussion of the course of action an individual should undertake
to realize relevance. For example, they consider the case where an
assumption has no contextual effects in any of the accessible
contexts. In this case, they claim that there is no point in extending
the context in order to search for relevance. But how does a person
know that an assumption has no contextual effects in any of the
accessible contexts without going through each of those contexts?
No explanation is offered. Likewise where an assumption has
some relevance in the initial context: S&W claim that "an exten-
sion of the context will be justified as long as it yields greater
contextual effects, and the increase in contextual effects is not
outweighed by the increase in processing effort required" (1986,
p. 143). But how do people ever know that there is not some other
context that will be more relevant than the one they possess at the
moment? What prevents people from always searching for a better
context? Again, S&W do not tell us. Their injunctions work only by
presupposing a solution to the frame problem, only by already
assuming that we can realize relevance.
In short, S&W have failed to explain the process of context
selection, and therefore beg the question with respect to the frame
problem. This is not merely a side issue, it is the central issue, and
what is at stake is nothing less than an explanation of how our
inferences during verbal comprehension manage to be rational.
By failing to elucidate the holistic nature of central processes,
S&W have not addressed Fodor's central concerns and hence have
not given us grounds for casting off the pallor of Fodorian gloom.
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Abstract: Chiappe & Kukla argue that relevance theory fails to
solve the frame problem as defined by Fodor. They are right. They
are wrong, however, to take Fodor's frame problem too seriously.
Fodor's concerns, on the other hand, even though they are wrongly
framed, are worth addressing. We argue that relevance theory
helps address them.
The AI (artificial intelligence) "frame problem" (McCarthy
& Hayes 1969) has been reinterpreted in a variety of ways
(Pylyshyn 1987). Fodor's is the loosest and grandest rein-
terpretation of all (Fodor 1987). The "frame problem," he
writes, is: "Hamlets problem: when to stop thinking"
(p. 140); the problem of formalizing the distinction between
"kooky facts" and "computationally relevant ones" (p. 145);
"just the problem of nondemonstrative inference" (p. 146);
"the problem of formalizing our intuitions about inductive
relevance" (p. 148). Fodor concludes that "the frame prob-
lem is too important to leave it to the hackers" (p. 148), and
Hayes retorts that "Fodor doesn't know the frame problem
from a bunch of bananas" (Hayes 1987, p. 132).
Undeterred, Chiappe & Kukla adopt Fodor's inter-
pretation of the problem, and argue that we have not solved
it. They are right, of course. Did we ever claim to have
solved Fodor's frame problem? Should we have done so? Is
it so clear that Fodor's problem is well posed in the first
place? What we did claim is that Relevance Theory (1986;
1987), and the study of verbal comprehension in particular,
could help us better understand central thought processes.
A mere ray of sunshine, obviously not enough to do away
with "the pallor of Fodorian gloom."
Fodor seems to know exactly what it takes to be rational,
and Chiappe & Kukla seem to have understood him. We
don't and we haven't. Fodor argues that "modular cognitive
processing is ipso facto irrational" in that it arrives at.
conclusions "by attending to less than all the evidence that
is relevant and available" (Fodor 1987; pp. 139-140). By
contrast, unencapsulated, central processes of belief fixa-
tion are rational, he argues, in that they make use of all the
relevant and available evidence. The question then seems
to be: How do central processes avoid getting bogged down
with all the irrelevant available evidence?
This is all very puzzling. Is it really the case that central
processes of belief fixation use all the relevant and available
evidence? Wouldn't that be enough to bog them down? You
have invited Granny for dinner and you wonder what main
course would most please her. Osso bucco, you decide,
remembering that she likes Italian food, raves about the
Capri restaurant whose specialty is osso bucco, and has
complained that you always serve her kedgeree. Reason-
able enough, but aon't you have, after all these years, much
more evidence of Granny's likes and dislikes? Didn't she,
for instance, once say that you couldn't find good veal any
more? And yet here you are, processing the veal shanks, and
not all these further bits of relevant information. The truth
of the matter is that central processes consider some of the
available relevant evidence, never all of it.
If it were crucial to rational belief fixation to consider all
the available relevant evidence, why shouldn't evidence
available in the environment (in libraries, for instance, or in
other peoples memories) be exploited too? Given Fodor's
criterion of rational belief fixation, why should the way in
which you access the relevant evidence - by remembering
or by consulting - matter to whether rationality demands its
use? Actually, we often do consider some of the environ-
mentally relevant information (you did check with Grandpa
that Granny had not eaten veal this week, didn't you?), but
never all of it.
By Fodor's criterion of rationality, since we fail to con-
sider all the relevant evidence, we are, in any case, irra-
tional. Come to think of it, would you want to be rational in
his sense? Do you want to consider all the (internally and
externally) available evidence every time you fix a belief-
which still would not guarantee that all your beliefs were
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true, but it would guarantee that you would fix far fewer of
them? Fodor's rationality is a purely epistemic matter: the
only utility is truth, and no price is too high to pay to
increase the chances that your beliefs are true. Fodor's
frame problem is: How do we manage to pay the exorbitant
price of such rationality? The short answer is that we don't.
A land of rationality worth having is one based on sound
accounting principles, where not only benefits, but also
costs are weighed. This, incidentally, is also the only land of
rationality that is at all likely to be found in evolved wetware
like ourselves. To be rational in this sense is to maximize the
expected cognitive utility of the information one attends to,
be it information picked from the environment or informa-
tion retrieved from memory.
We use "relevance" as a theoretical term to refer to the
cognitive utility of a piece of information in a context, or for
an individual at a given time (Sperber & Wilson 1986;
1987). Relevance so understood has two aspects, cognitive
effect (the benefit) and processing effort (the cost). The
cognitive effect, if any, of processing a piece of information
is to allow fixation or revision of beliefs. Effort is a matter of
greater or lesser mobilization of brain resources in order to
achieve this effect. Ceterisparibus, the greater the effect of
processing a given piece of information, the greater its
relevance. Ceteris paribus, the greater the effort involved in
processing a given piece of information, the lower its
relevance.
Here is a toy illustration. You have bought a ticket for a
lottery and you know the prizes are $10, $500, and $1000.
Suppose you are informed of one of three things:
(a) You have won $500.
(b) You have won $10, $500, or $1000.
(c) Either you have not won $500, or the square root of 2207 is not 49,
but not both.
Information (a) is more relevant than information (b)
because (a) implies (b) and therefore has all the effects of
(b) plus some of its own, without greater cost in effort.
Information (a) is also more relevant than information (c),
although (a) and (c) are logically equivalent and therefore
carry exactly the same effects. However, in the case of (c),
achieving these effects involves greater effort. This may not
correspond to your favorite meaning for the vague English
word "relevance." If so, we would want to argue that either
relevance in your sense plays no distinct role in cognitive
processes, or else relevance in your sense is a special case of
°ur more general theoretical notion.
At any given moment in one's cognitive life, there is a
wide range of new information being monitored in the
environment, and there is an even wider range of informa-
tion in memory, bits of which might be activated and would
Provide a context in which to process the information from
the environment (or other pieces of information from
Memory). Only some of the possible combinations of new
and contextual information would yield relevance, and this
to a greater or lesser degree. There is no way for the mind to
review all possible combinations of new and contextual
information in order to find out which would maximize
relevance. Even if there were a way, the effort involved in
such a review would so lower the overall cognitive utility of
the process as to defeat the whole enterprise. So how
£nould the mind proceed? Since it cannot have fore-
knowledge of relevance, how can the mind have, at least,
nonarbitrary expectations of relevance?
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To begin with, when expectations of effect are wholly
indeterminate, the mind should base itself on consider-
ations of effort — picking up from the environment the most
easily attended stimulus and processing it in the context of
what comes most readily to mind. Ceteris paribus, what is
easier is more relevant, if it is relevant at all. But what are
the chances that what comes more easily to mind is, in fact,
relevant? They would be close to nil, if salience in the
environment and accessibility in memory were both ran-
dom, and, moreover, uncorrelated. But humans are evolved
organisms with learning capacities of sorts, so it is not too
surprising to find that they spontaneously pay more atten-
tion to moving objects than to still objects, to looming
objects than to receding objects, to sudden noises than to
constant noises, to other people's faces than to other
people s feet, to their own children than to others', and so
on, that is, to objects and events that, on average, are more
likely to be relevant to them.
For the same reason, it is not surprising that the percep-
tual categorization of a distal stimulus should tend to
activate related information in memory. Thus, having your
attention attracted by a snake tends to make your beliefs
about snakes, at that moment, more accessible than your
beliefs about the frame problem. Nor is it surprising that
memory is so organized that pieces of information that are
likely to be simultaneously relevant tend to be coaccessed
or coactivated in chunks variously described in the litera-
ture as "concepts," "schemas," "scripts," "dossiers," and so
forth.
Chiappe & Kukla might want to follow Fodor and argue
that such suggestions are a way to beg, rather than to begin
answering, the question. Consider the concept of a frid-
geon: "x is a fridgeon at t iff x is a particle at t and [Fodor's]
fridge is on at t" (Fodor 1987; p. 144). Were you to learn that
Fodor's fridge has just been turned on, you could infer of
every particle in the Universe that it is now a fridgeon. How
is that for cognitive effect! Why, then, don't we have such
kooky concepts, and why don't we keep inferring such
kooky facts? Because, contrary to appearances, such cogni-
tive effect is of the weakest kind. Once you have inferred
that a given particle is a fridgeon, or that all particles are
fridgeons, nothing further follows. Such deadend infer-
ences are not worth the effort. Compare inferring that some
food is refrigerated: from this you can infer that it will keep
longer, that it will taste different, and these facts in turn
have further consequences. Why the difference? Because
we have a "theory" of refrigeration, not one of fridgeoniza-
tion. Relevance considerations will favor concepts with rich
inferential potential, typically concepts embodying some
land of causal theory. But why couldn't we have inferentially
rich kooky concepts? We can and we do: astrology is an
example. However, the biological function of cognition is
served mostly through roughly true theories that give the
organism some control over specific aspects of its environ-
ment (there is a much longer story to be told here: see
Sperber 1994; Tooby & Cosmides 1992).
Chiappe & Kukla object to our claim that memory is
organized in chunks, as if it were some controversial posit of
ours, and not the most common presupposition of all the
memory literature. They also object that, since we don't say
much about what goes in a given chunk, we leave open the
possibility of tailoring particular chunks so as to confirm -
vacuously - our relevance-based predictions. They are
quite right: we don't have a theory of memory of our own,
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nor do we claim to have one. Our concern has been, rather,
to develop an account of some cognitive processes that
relates in a mutually beneficial way with what is known, or
will be discovered, about the organization of human mem-
ory. In general, relevance theory predicts that memory will
tend (both from a phylogenetic and an ontogenetic point of
view) to be organized in a relevance-boosting manner.
Relevance-theoretic analyses of a particular cognitive pro-
cess, say, of the retrieval of implicature from a given
utterance, imply that some particular pieces of information
are chunked and tend to be activated together, thus making
the analysis vulnerable to experimental techniques (e.g.,
priming) used in memory and categorization research.
Adopting independently motivated and testable assump-
tions about attention and memory, we argue that relevant
evidence is likely to be found by following a path of least
effort. Minimizing effort, then, is not just reasonable thrift,
it is an epistemically sound strategy.
But once on the path of least effort, how far should you
go? Fodor's Hamlet problem, "when to stop thinking,"
would have no general answer if you had a single, open-
ended thought process active in your mind (e.g., comparing
the merits of being vs. not being). Unlike Fodor's Hamlet,
however, humans have in mind, at any given time, several
active or near-active conceptual processes competing for
cognitive resources. In such conditions, Fodors Hamlet
problem has a simple in-principle answer. Let the processes
with greater expected relevance win. But, of course, this
time, we want expectations of effect to be a determinant
factor, for least effort by itself would end up favoring no
effort at all.
We assume that cognitive processes proceed in a way that
is sensitive to the level of effect they achieve, and to the
level of effort they expend (just as bodily movement pro-
ceeds in a way that is sensitive to the effect achieved and to
muscular effort expended). This does not mean that the
mind computes representations of effect and effort, let
alone absolute values. All that might be involved is a
sensitivity to marginal changes in levels of effect and effort
and, for example, an automatic increase of effort for pro-
cesses where effect is on the increase, and, after an initial
grace period, a decrease of effort or a deactivation for
processes where effect is on the decrease or is nil. Of
course, automatic allocation of cognitive resources based
on such a very rough implicit evaluation of expected rele-
vance would allow many unproductive processes to carry on
for too long, and would terminate too early some processes
with great hidden potential. Your chances of ever making a
true scientific discovery would be extremely slim. Well,
actually, they are.
Relevance theory makes claims about cognition in gen-
eral and about communication in particular. Chiappe &
Kukla show no understanding of our claims about commu-
nication. Communication, we argue, raises and exploits
definite expectations of relevance. Whereas individual
spontaneous cognitive activity aims at maximal relevance
and may have no better way of doing so than a form of blind
hill climbing (feel the terrain, choose a path that goes up but
is not too rough), comprehension aims at a specific level of
relevance indicated by the act of communication itself.
(How? Read Relevance.)
Fodor asks: "[w]hat is a nonarbitrary strategy for delimit-
ing the evidence that should be searched in rational belief
fixation?" (Fodor 1987, p. 140). We have just hinted at how
to answer this question: a nonarbitrary strategy available to
cognitively endowed evolved organisms consists of trying to
maximize the expected effect/effort ratio. This will be
effective even if the organism has nothing better to base its
choices on than a sensitivity to immediate increments and
decrements in levels of effect and effort. Of course, such an
organism would not be rational in Fodors sense, but we
claim that no individual organism ever is. Enduring collec-
tive cognitive enterprises where, through communication,
relevance can be better targeted may begin to display
shades of the land of rationality that Fodor attributes to
individual human cognition. Scientific thinking is a case in
point. The chances of an isolated individual cognizer mak-
ing a true scientific discovery are not slim - they are
nonexistent. So are the chances of understanding the cogni-
tive basis of scientific achievements without understanding
the more modest cognitive feat that each of us performs
thousand times every day in understanding what someone
else is saying.
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